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        Project Royal Synergies Quantification Analysis

Enclosed  please  find  our  initial  impressions  of  the  study
purported  to  calculate  the  synergies  related  to  a  Western
Resources  (WR) Kansas City Power and Light (KCPL)  merger.   Our
analysis  is  preliminary and is based entirely  on  our  initial
examination  of  the  "Project  Royal  Synergies  Quantification"
report.  We have not performed a conclusive review of that report
nor  have  we performed any review of the underlying work  papers
and supporting documentation.

Our  preliminary  examination of the  Western  Resources  synergy
report  resulted in the identification of three areas of concern:
flawed methodology, invalid assumptions, and the use of incorrect
data.  We believe that these concerns significantly undermine the
credibility  of the $1 billion synergy number presented  in  that
study.   The following paragraphs highlight our concerns in  each
of the three areas.

Flawed Methodology

The  following paragraphs discuss two areas of synergies in which
we  believe  the methodologies employed by WR are  flawed:  labor
savings and procurement savings.

Labor Savings--Analysis of the quantification of labor  synergies
resulting  from  a WR/KCPL merger identified several  weaknesses:
the   use  of  announcement  vs.  process/function  analyses   or
achievement  based  data,  the assumption  of  leading  practices
inherent   in  the  announcement  information  data   base,   the
variability  of the data included in the announcement information
database,  and  the employment of FTE reduction  benchmarks  that
significantly exceeded the averages included in the  announcement
information database.

WR  determines  labor  reductions using benchmarks  derived  from
previous  utility  merger  announcements.   Reviewing  previously
announced synergies, WR identifies percentage reductions for each
of  the  utility  processes reviewed.  Those individual  function
percentages  are  averaged and the means  are  then  adjusted  to
reflect the unique characteristics of the specific merger.  These
percentages  are  applied to the FTEs  in  each  process  of  the
combined company to estimate total company FTE reductions.  Ernst
& Young believes this methodology has several flaws.

Announcement Data--We believe that the use of announcement data is
inferior   to  process/function  analysis  or  to  the   use   of
achievement based data.  Announcement data is a forecast  of  the
synergies that the two parties hope to achieve as a result of the
merger.   In  the  WR/KCPL analysis, we believe the  announcement
data  has  been  strongly influenced by prior  announcement  data
rather  than  either  management  estimates  or  process/function
analysis.  Consequently, the WR methodology for quantifying labor
reductions  is  a  "best guess" based upon other "best  guesses",
which  again are based upon prior "best guesses".  Because  these
estimates  do  not  appear  to  be based  upon  results  actually
achieved  in  prior  mergers nor are  they  based  on  reductions
identified  through functional/process analysis, this methodology
appears to have no analytical basis.

Leading   Practices  and   Ongoing   Initiatives--Assuming   that
announcement data benchmarks are acceptable, as implied  by  WR's
reference  to  the KPL/KGE merger as support for  some  of  their
analyses, we believe that these benchmarks include the  value  of
best  practices.   To the extent that the WR  benchmarks  may  be
based  on  the  results  of  previous mergers,  they  necessarily
include  the effect of both the application of leading  practices
and  ongoing  cost reduction or revenue enhancement  initiatives.
For   example,  in  the  consummation  of  the  KPL/KGE   merger,
management of the merged company would employ best practices  and
leading   edge   technology  in  combining  the  two   companies.
Moreover,  it could also be expected that a competent  management
group would continue with initiatives that were under way at  the
time  of  the merger.  The effect to these two efforts, which  in
some   cases  could  be  significant  relative  to  the   savings
identified from the merger, would be to achieve savings at a pace
well  ahead  of  the timeline identified in the synergies  study.
This  results from the fact that these efforts should  have  been
excluded  for the synergies analyis and therefore is additive  to
the  merger  savings.   Consequently, simply achieving  synergies
identified  prior to the merger could only mean two  things:  the
synergies study overstates synergies by including such things  as
ongoing initiatives or that secondly, management made no positive
contribution to competitiveness of the organization  during  that
timetable, but for the merger.  Excepting incompetent management,
the benchmarks employed by WR would tend to overstate synergies.

Data  Variability--The third  issue  relative  to  the  WR  labor
quantification is that the benchmarks employed are developed from
nine  data  points (previous transactions) which have  deviations
around  the  functional  means of  over  three  times  the  means
themselves.   These  deviations imply that the  means  themselves
have  little  statistical relevance in predicting FTE  reductions
related  to  individual  functions.  Moreover,  these  deviations
point  up the uniqueness of each merger and the problems inherent
in  employing  such statistics to forecast future  merger-related
FTE reductions.

FTE  Reductions in  Excess of Functional Means--The  final  labor
savings  issue  is  that  in  calculating  individual  functional
process  FTE reductions, WR employed an average of  over 120%  of
the  announcement  database mean in calculating  FTE  reductions.
Using  this  multiple overstates synergies relative to  what  the
database average would imply.

In  summary,  our  preliminary examination indicates  that  labor
savings   are  derived  from  benchmarks  that  are  based   upon
irrelevant  data  (announcement data),  that  inherently  include
leading  practices and ongoing initiatives, that have significant
statistical  problems  at  the functional  level,  and  that  are
calculated  based upon statistics that are far in excess  of  the
means of the benchmarks of the individual functions.

Procurement Savings--Analysis of procurement synergies  developed
by  WR indicates three potential areas of concern:  overstatement
of  the  types  of  materials on which supplier leverage  can  be
achieved,  overstatement  of the volume  of  materials  on  which
leveraged  discounts can be obtained in the  types  of  materials
identified above, and finally the overstatement of the  value  of
the   discounts  available  resulting  from  increased   supplier
leverage.

Generation  Materials--It appears that  the  WR  synergies  study
calculates  material  and  contract  service  savings  by  simply
assuming  a  5% discount on all purchases of the merger  parties.
An  analysis of KCPL and UtiliCorp generation materials indicated
that   the   standardization  required  to  achieve   significant
discounts  from increased volume was not possible  in  the  short
term  and  speculative in the long term.  Our analysis  indicates
that  an  assumption  of any discount on all  material  purchases
overstates the synergies of the two merging parties.

Small  Volume Items--As  stated above, it  appears  that  WR  has
included  all  purchases in its calculation of supplier  leverage
discounts.  Again, our study found that a significant portion  of
items  were  unique to the merging parties or were  purchased  in
such  small  volumes that significant additional discounts  could
not be obtained from the combination of purchases.  To the extent
that purchases of the two merging parties in the WR study include
small volume or unique items, the WR synergies are overstated.

Leverage Discounts--As discussed above, it appears  that  the  WR
study   calculated  procurement  synergies  by  multiplying   all
purchases  by  5%.  As indicated above, our study indicates  that
the  universe  of  materials  that  should  be  included  in  the
calculation of the procurement synergy is significantly less than
all  purchases.   In  addition, we found, based  upon  a  limited
vendor survey, that the mean discount that could be obtained  for
transmission  and distribution materials was well  below  the  5%
assumed  by  WR.   This overstated discount rate results  in  the
overstatement  of  the  value of the WR procurement  synergy  and
compounds the overstatements described above.

In  summary,  the procurement savings synergies  reported  by  WR
appear  to  be overstated because the universe of materials  upon
which  they  calculate  savings is  too  large  and  because  the
discount rate applied to the overstated volume is also too large.

Invalid Assumptions

In  developing  WR/KCPL synergies, Ernst & Young  found  what  we
believe to be several questionable assumptions: the inclusion  of
skills, technology and philosophy transfers, the assumption  that
all  but  some IT synergies are achieved on January 1, 1998,  the
assumption of aggressive benefits multiples and escalations,  and
a  short  depreciable  life of the proposed  avoided  information
technology systems.

Skills,  Technology  and  Philosophy  Transfers--In   calculating
WR/KCPL  synergies, WR has stated that they have included skills,
technology and philosophy transfers.  While specific examples  of
these transfers are not identified in the report, the implication
is  that pure merger synergies, those that result simply from the
merging  of existing processes and functions, have been leveraged
by  the  adoption of leading or better practices, technology,  or
philosophy transfers that could otherwise be purchased by  either
of  the  merging  parties.  Because efficiency enablers  such  as
philosophy transfers could be purchased, and do not arise  simply
as  a  result of merging functions or processes, only the avoided
cost  of  these  items  should be included  as  a  synergy.   For
example, if one party has an existing CIS that will increase  the
productivity of its merger partner, we believe that labor savings
benefits  related to that CIS should be included  as  a  synergy,
only  in  the case where those savings are less than the  avoided
cost  of  constructing, implementing and maintaining the  avoided
system.   Similarly, the adoption of better or leading  practices
by  NewCo, brought to the merger by either of the parties, should
be  valued  not  by the efficiency gains achieved  by  the  party
without that practice, but at the cost that party would have  had
to  pay  to acquire that knowledge.  This same philosophy  should
apply  to  all  skills,  technology or philosophy  transfers,  as
valuing  synergies  in  excess of purchase  price  results  in  a
distortion of the nature of the synergies and an overstatement of
their value.

Synergies Achieved by January 1, 1998--The WR study assumes  that
all  synergies will be achieved by January 1, 1998.   We  do  not
believe  that this timetable is realistic, particularly in  light
of  the  proposed  reductions of 531 FTEs.  Further,  we  do  not
believe  that  531  FTEs can be eliminated  on  January  1,  1998
without  involuntary  separations.  It is our  belilef  that  the
growth  potential related to this combination will not support  a
scenario where these reductions could be achieved through avoided
hires  by  January  1,  1998.  We also do  not  believe  that  an
attrition rate of 1% can support a reduction of 531 employees  by
that  date.  Finally, it may be possible that WR could  introduce
such  draconian  measures as to make employment by  the  proposed
NewCo  so unpalatable to existing employees that they leave,  but
we  believe this is still a stretch in this time frame.   In  any
case,   the   employment  of  such  measures  would   effectively
constitute a involuntary separation.  In summary, we believe  the
savings  identified  by WR associated with  labor  reductions  is
significantly  overstated, not only because these reductions  are
calculated  employing a flawed methodology, but also because  the
savings   are  assumed  to  be  generated,  but  for  information
technology, immediately.

Aggressive Benefits Multiples and Escalation Rates--The  WR study
includes  what  we believe to be generous benefits multiples  and
aggressive  escalation assumptions.  In calculating benefits,  WR
assumed  a  34%  benefit rate for KCPL when  in  fact,  based  on
information  from  KCPL,  the rate is about  26%.   Secondly,  WR
assumes  that salaries and benefits will escalate at  an  average
rate  of  4.3% for the next ten years.  We believe 3.5% to  be  a
more  realistic  rate.   The result of  aggressive  benefits  and
escalation assumptions is to overstate labor synergies.

Short  Depreciable  Lives--The  WR study  appears  to  assume the
replacement of avoided information systems every five years.   We
believe  that,  on average, these systems are not  replaced  five
years subsequent to their implementation, but rather over a  7-10
year  period.  Our study assumed the replacement of  all  systems
only once during the ten-year period.  The effect of using a five-
year  useful  life in calculating synergies is to include  system
construction  costs,  and  related  capitalization  costs,  twice
within the ten-year period.

Incorrect Data

The  third area of concern relates to the incorrect data used by
WR  to  support  the  calculation of synergies  for  the  WR/KCPL
merger. Examples of incorrect data include CIS development costs,
transaction costs, data center costs and FTE information.

CIS   Development  Costs--In  developing  information  technology
synergies,   WR   significantly   overstated   the    KCPL    CIS
implementation costs.  This overstatement was identified  by  the
review of the KCPL budget.  Because the value of the synergy  was
calculated  based upon an assumed avoided KCPL cost to  construct
the CIS, this synergy is overstated by the difference between the
WR   assumption  and  actual  budgeted  cost,  increased  by  the
capitalization factor.

Transaction  Costs--The WR study did not include  $88 million  of
transaction costs identified by WR as required to consummate  the
deal.  The nominal value of the synergies is simply overstated by
that value.

Data  Center Costs--In performing an analysis of KCPL data center
costs,  WR  overstated the cost of KCPL data  center  operations.
The data center synergy is calculated based upon the adoption  of
KCPL  cost  structure, which, as identified by Western Resources,
was  significantly  lower.  Because the cost  of  the  KCPL  data
center is overstated, the related synergy is overstated.

FTE   Information--In   calculating   FTE   reductions,  WR   has
overestimated the number of actual FTEs employed by  KCPL.   This
overstated FTE number was then allocated among the relevant  KCPL
processes to provide the basis for calculating process by process
FTE  reductions.  Process specific FTE reductions then were  then
calculated by multiplying the number of FTEs in each process by a
percentage  established  based  on previous  merger  announcement
data.   (See Methodology Flaws.)  While the allocation scheme  to
distribute  FTEs among those processes is not identified  in  the
report,  it is clear that the total KCPL FTEs tie to the  sum  of
the  FTEs  identified in each process.  Consequently, we  believe
the  number of FTEs identified as reductions in each process  are
overstated in proportion to the overstatement identified  by  the
analysis of total KCPL FTEs.